Is Tanzania’s president ‘Looking East’?

By Peter Fabricius

PRITORIA – Samia Suluhu Hassan’s state visit to Moscow could signal a global reorientation – or it could be just hedging bets.

In June, President Samia Suluhu Hassan conducted Tanzania’s first state visit to Russia since the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere, travelled there in 1969. Her visit, with a large business delegation, included a meeting with President Vladimir Putin.

It was probably no coincidence that Russia initially made overtures to Samia after her 98% win in the controversial October 2025 elections, from which her rival, Tundu Lissu, head of the Chadema party, had been barred.

The African Union said ‘the 2025 [elections] did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.’ Even the Southern African Development Community (SADC) noted that ‘in most areas, voters could not express their democratic will. Overall, [Tanzania’s 2025 polls] fell short of the requirements of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.’

Being so clearly unfair, the elections sparked widespread protests that were brutally suppressed, which in turn provoked considerable local and international condemnation. Human Rights Watch estimated that ‘at least hundreds’ of protesters were killed. African human rights groups put the figure as high as 3 000. Lissu’s Chadema party said over 2 000. An internet shutdown and local media blackout made verifying the numbers difficult.

But in April, Judge Mohamed Chande Othman, chairperson of the commission of inquiry appointed by Samia into the violence, reported the death toll as 518, and laid the blame largely on oppositionists. He said there was ‘indisputable evidence’ that uprisings against the government had been planned and funded by ‘trained people.’

But Western governments are not buying that. They have condemned the state for political violence and started moves to sanction it.

On 21 May, the United States (US) Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the US had imposed a travel ban on Police Chief Faustine Jackson Mafwele based on ‘credible information that he was involved in gross violations of human rights.’ The sanctions order says Tanzania’s police ‘detained, tortured, and sexually assaulted Ugandan Agather Atuhaire and Kenyan Boniface Mwangi.’ The two human rights activists had travelled to Tanzania last year to monitor Lissu’s treason trial.

Meanwhile, a bipartisan bill prompted by the post-election crackdown passed out of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to the full Senate in June. The bill would cut US economic support for Tanzania, assess its growing ties with China and Russia, and require a comprehensive review of the US-Tanzania relationship.

And this month, the European Parliament voted to stop the proposed disbursement of a €156-million European Union development package for Tanzania’s 2026 cooperation programme, citing concerns over post-election violence and democratic backsliding. To pass, the vote would need European Commission endorsement.

The Western ground seems to be shifting against Tanzania as it moves from democracy towards autocracy. And Samia’s Moscow visit suggests alienation from the West is pushing Tanzania and Russia closer together.

Putin is known to seize opportunities when African countries fall out with the West over democracy issues. In the Sahel, Russia has supported military juntas that ousted elected civilian governments and expelled Western governments. Though, as Institute for Security Studies Research Officer Zenge Simakoloyi points out, Tanzania doesn’t face the same security vulnerabilities that created openings for Russian influence there.

But does Samia’s Moscow trip indicate that she is reciprocating, adopting a ‘Look East’ policy and turning her back on the West for its criticism?

‘Russia offers political engagement without attaching governance or human rights conditionalities in the way many Western partners do, making it an attractive diplomatic option for governments under external pressure,’ says Tanzanian political scientist Nicodemus Minde.

Nonetheless, he says, Samia’s visit should be understood less as an ideological shift than as a pragmatic diversification of Tanzania’s foreign policy options.

‘I would be cautious about interpreting it as a wholesale return to a “Look East” foreign policy. Tanzania has historically pursued a relatively non-aligned and pragmatic foreign policy. Under Samia, we have seen engagement with Western partners, Gulf states, China, India and, increasingly, Russia. The Moscow visit fits within this broader strategy of expanding diplomatic and economic partnerships rather than replacing one bloc with another.’

Simakoloyi says, ‘Tanzania has, at different points, strategically leveraged partnerships with countries such as China and Brazil to advance major infrastructure projects where many Western partners were either unwilling or unable to engage.’

Tanzania has important economic and other relations with Russia to maintain and develop. In 2025 it imported some US$278 million in goods from Russia, exporting only about US$27.5 million, leaving a large trade deficit. Samia’s Moscow visit revived momentum for trade and investment, most notably the US$1 billion Mkuju River uranium project being developed by Russia’s Rosatom. Tanzania also has a military cooperation agreement with Russia.

Yet successfully pursuing a non-aligned policy is not necessarily up to Tanzania alone. South Africa also pursues what it regards as non-alignment, attempting to maintain strong relations with Russia, China and Iran while enjoying good relations with the US and Europe. That has worked with Europe, but not the US, which hit Pretoria with extra aid cuts, tariffs and other measures.

Will Tanzania experience the same problems? Perhaps not, as Minde questions whether significant sanctions against Tanzania will materialise.

‘Tanzania remains an important regional partner in East Africa, and many Western governments [would likely] weigh governance concerns against broader strategic interests, including regional stability, security cooperation and development partnerships. Any future measures are therefore more likely to be targeted than broad-based.’

Indeed, in his confirmation hearing before the US Senate in April, new US ambassador to Tanzania William Trachman emphasised the country’s ‘immense strategic importance to the United States.’ He noted efforts to counter maritime threats such as narco-trafficking, as well as Tanzania’s critical minerals and rare earths. Though he added, when pressed by senators, that he would also hold Tanzania to account for the post-election violence.

Given the current US administration’s transactional diplomacy, critical minerals and the like will probably trump concerns about democracy in Tanzania.

 Peter Fabricius is Consultant, ISS Pretoria